Synthesis Summary

2026-05-18 Daily Refresh — T-118 to next-cycle anchor

This is the forward-cycle companion to the Tidö-mandate scorecard analysis under ../current/. It treats the post-2026 governing arrangement as the analytical target, holding T+0 at the 2026-09-13 election anchor and projecting through 2030-09-08. The cycle-rollover predicate (ext/cycle-rollover.md) is inactive at T-118 (activation window ±30 days of 2026-09-13). [A1]

Headline assessment: there are three structurally plausible governing arrangements for the 2026–2030 mandate — (A) Tidö continuation in M+KD+SD configuration (with or without L), (B) centre pivot (M+KD+L+C), (C) S-led red-green-centre coalition. Even-money (45–55% [horizon:election]) the 2026-09-13 result is a hung-parliament-style outcome requiring extended coalition formation (> 30 days), with caretaker-government risk roughly even (40–55%) by 2026-10-15. See scenario-analysis.md for the full 12-leaf tree.

Cross-reference to current: the NATO commitment, defence-to-2%-GDP floor, e-ID rollout (HD03250), financial-stability legislation (HD01FiU37/HD01FiU38), and EU EED transposition (HD01CU30) are all very likely (75–90% [horizon:cycle]) to survive any 2026-09 outcome because they are bound by NATO/EU treaty obligations or by enacted statute, not by coalition arithmetic.

Three Cycle-Defining Structural Findings (Post-2026)

1. Coalition arithmetic is the binding constraint, not policy preference. Latest aggregated polling (sources: Novus, Sifo, Demoskop 2026-04 / 2026-05 waves [A2]) puts the M+KD+L+SD bloc at 48–51% and the S+MP+V+C bloc at 46–49%. With L hovering at 3.5–4.5% (below-threshold risk roughly even 35–50% [horizon:election]) and C at 4.5–6.0%, the deciding bloc is the 4-percent threshold survival of L (see wildcards-blackswans.md §W4). Likely (60–75% [horizon:election]) the post-election seat distribution forces a 60+ day talman-led negotiation.

2. Security and digital-sovereignty laws are structurally durable but fiscal redistribution and climate ambition are bloc-contingent. Under any A-scenario the FY2027 budget continues the Tidö fiscal stance (modest deficit-to-GDP, defence-spending floor); under any C-scenario the budget tilts towards redistribution (welfare uprating, energy-subsidy retargeting). PESTLE-economic vulnerabilities (pestle-analysis.md) shift accordingly.

3. The "EU-compliance backlog" handover is the most overlooked transition risk. The exiting coalition cleared HD01CU30 (EPBD), HD01FiU38 (EU clearing), and gender-reporting directives in the last 90 days of mandate (see ../current/synthesis-summary.md). The incoming government inherits near-zero EU-infringement risk but near-zero political ownership of those laws, meaning likely (60–70% [horizon:cycle]) that any post-2026 government will face opposition motions to revisit at least one EU-derived statute by Q2-2027.

Integrated Intelligence Picture

The post-2026 mandate is being shaped now (May 2026) by three concurrent dynamics:

• Late-mandate positioning by current opposition (V, MP, S, C) — rural framework HD01NU21, consent law HD10483, elderly-care HD10484, prostitution-taxation HD10485, equal-pay HD10486 are campaign-positioning vehicles, unlikely (10–25% [horizon:election]) to enact pre-election but likely (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) to surface as governing-coalition planks in any C-scenario.
• Coalition-cohesion test for SD inside vs outside cabinet — under A1 SD stays external (Tidöavtalet model); under A2 SD enters cabinet (first time). Constitutional and Lagrådet pressure rises sharply under A2 (roughly even 40–55% [horizon:cycle] Lagrådet rejects an A2-coalition migration amendment to HD03267).
• Economic backdrop: IMF WEO Apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0 vintage projects Sweden GGXWDG_NGDP at 32.4% (2026), 33.1% (2027 T+1), 33.8% (2028 T+2), 34.3% (2029 T+3), 34.6% (2030 T+4) under unchanged-policy baseline. [A1] Real GDP growth converges to 2.1% by 2028 from 1.6% in 2026. NGDPDPC (per-capita) growth holds 1.5–1.8% across horizon.

Mermaid: Post-2026 Mandate Coalition Probability Tree (top-level)

flowchart TD
  E["2026-09-13 Riksdagsval"] --> A["Tidö continuation 32%"]
  E --> B["Centre pivot 18%"]
  E --> C["S-led 28%"]
  E --> D["Hung / extraordinary 22%"]
  A --> A1["A1 Tidö 2.0 12.8%"]
  A --> A2["A2 Tidö no-L 11.2%"]
  A --> A3["A3 Tidö+C security-only 8.0%"]
  B --> B1["B1 Clean centre 7.2%"]
  B --> B2["B2 Centre+MP 5.4%"]
  B --> B3["B3 Centre min+S abstain 5.4%"]
  C --> C1["C1 S-MP-V majority 11.2%"]
  C --> C2["C2 S-MP min+V ext 8.4%"]
  C --> C3["C3 S+C inside 8.4%"]
  D --> D1["D1 Extra election Q1-27 8.8%"]
  D --> D2["D2 Caretaker 60d+ 7.7%"]
  D --> D3["D3 Grand M+S coalition 5.5%"]
  style A fill:#003366,stroke:#00d9ff,color:#fff
  style B fill:#006633,stroke:#00ff99,color:#fff
  style C fill:#660033,stroke:#ff006e,color:#fff
  style D fill:#663300,stroke:#ffbe0b,color:#fff

DIW-Weighted Forward Watchlist (Top 10 — Post-2026 Cycle)

DIW = Decision-Impact Weight per significance-scoring.md. All scores ICD 203 [A2]-graded; per pir-status.json standing PIR-1…PIR-7 plus PIR-8 (next-cycle coalition formation) active.

ICD 203 BLUF (per osint-tradecraft-standards.md)

• BLUF-1 (high confidence [A2]): The 2026–2030 governing arrangement will be determined more by the 4-percent threshold survival of L and C's coalition preference than by aggregate bloc polling. Even-money (45–55% [horizon:election]) hung-parliament outcome requiring > 30 day coalition negotiation.
• BLUF-2 (medium confidence [B2]): Security, NATO and digital-sovereignty commitments are very likely (75–90% [horizon:cycle]) durable across any 2026-09 outcome. Fiscal redistribution and climate ambition are roughly even (40–55%) bloc-contingent.
• BLUF-3 (medium confidence [B3]): Post-2026 EU-derived legislation (HD01CU30, HD01FiU38) faces likely (60–70% [horizon:cycle]) opposition motions to revisit by Q2-2027 under any C-scenario.

Cross-Run Continuity

This synthesis carries forward from the 2026-05-11 forward-cycle baseline (next/ anchor first established in this run cycle). Confidence bands held within ±5 pp vs current/ mandate-scorecard analysis. No new dok_ids since 2026-05-12 publication wave (HD01CU30, HD01NU21, HD10483–6); no late-cycle filings on the next-cycle agenda. PIR-8 newly armed for next-cycle coalition-formation watch.

[A1] IMF WEO Apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; vintage age 1 month, fresh. [A2] Aggregated Sifo / Novus / Demoskop polling Apr–May 2026; methodology and provenance in methodology-reflection.md §Polling triangulation.

Intelligence Assessment — Key Judgments

Key Judgements

• KJ-1: We assess with high confidence [A2] that the 2026-09-13 election will produce no single-bloc majority; the post-election governing arrangement very likely (75–85% [horizon:election]) requires negotiated coalition formation rather than seat-arithmetic certainty.
• KJ-2: We assess with medium confidence [B2] that the L 4-percent-threshold survival is the single most-leveraged variable in the seat distribution; roughly even (50–65%) L exceeds threshold.
• KJ-3: We assess with medium confidence [B2] that defence-spending floor, NATO obligations, and EU-derived statutes are durable across any 2026-09 outcome; very likely (75–90% [horizon:cycle]).
• KJ-4: We assess with medium confidence [B3] that fiscal redistribution and climate ambition are highly bloc-contingent and will diverge materially under A vs C scenarios.
• KJ-5: We assess with low-to-medium confidence [C2] that coalition formation will exceed 30 days; likely (55–70% [horizon:election]).

Key Assumptions Check

1. ASSUMPTION: Polling vintage 2026-04 / 2026-05 is structurally representative of 2026-09-13 result. SUSTAINED: Sifo / Novus / Demoskop methodological consistency since 2022; aggregate variance < 1.5 pp. CHALLENGE: Late-cycle volatility events (W3 KU-anmälan upheld, W5 SD succession) could move 3–5 pp.
2. ASSUMPTION: Sainte-Laguë math (modified) holds. SUSTAINED: No constitutional reform pending.
3. ASSUMPTION: Coalition cohesion under SD-cabinet entry (A2) survives Lagrådet. CHALLENGED: Roughly even (40–55%) Lagrådet rejection of any A2 migration amendment to HD03267.

Information Gaps

• Gap-1: SD internal cabinet-entry decision under A2 leaf — limited public signalling.
• Gap-2: C coalition preference — public position deferred to August 2026.
• Gap-3: NATO 2025/2026 ministerial pressure on 3% defence spending floor — not public.
• Gap-4: Russia escalation tempo over campaign window — high-uncertainty input to W1.

Confidence-Vintage Breakdown

Alternative Hypotheses (ACH-style)

• AH-1: Pre-election shock pivots polling 5+ pp in 30 days. Unlikely (20–30%).
• AH-2: Coalition formation < 14 days (modal). Unlikely (15–25%) under any scenario.
• AH-3: Constitutional crisis triggers extraordinary process. Unlikely (10–20%) over 60-day post-election window.

Cross-Reference

• Counterfactuals → devils-advocate.md
• Risk distribution → risk-assessment.md
• Forward indicators → forward-indicators.md

Significance Scoring

Per intelligence-analysis-techniques significance methodology. Scale 1–10.

Scoring Methodology

DIW = base impact × time-discounted weight × confidence factor. Confidence factor ranges 0.6 (low-confidence forecast) to 1.0 (calendar event).

Stakeholder Perspectives

Five-perspective framing per intelligence-analysis-techniques. Each perspective frames the same fact set through the actor's incentive structure.

1. Tidö Government Bloc (M+KD+L+SD external)

• Frame: Continuity narrative; mandate-fulfilment scorecard (see ../current/synthesis-summary.md) as 2022–2026 record; defence floor; HD03267 / HD03250 / HD01CU30 enacted.
• Strategic interest: A1 / A2 coalition continuation; framing as "stability + delivery".
• Vulnerabilities: L threshold; KU-anmälan ledger; SD cabinet-entry framing.

2. Opposition Bloc (S+MP+V+C)

• Frame: "Alternatives" narrative; HD01NU21 rural framework, HD10483 consent, HD10484 elderly-care, HD10485 prostitution-taxation, HD10486 equal-pay as platform planks; redistribution + climate-ambition.
• Strategic interest: C1 / C3 coalition with seat-math + climate-economy linkage.
• Vulnerabilities: C coalition-preference ambiguity; V cabinet-entry uncertain; MP polling volatility.

3. EU Institutional Partners (Commission, Council, EP)

• Frame: Compliance + transposition track record; HD01CU30 EPBD on schedule; HD01FiU38 clearing-regulation operational by Q4-2026.
• Strategic interest: Continuity of EU-derived statute regardless of 2026-09 outcome.
• Concerns: Opposition motions to revisit EU-derived statutes under C scenarios (likely 60–70% [cycle]); EU EED 2030 building-stock follow-on (pestle-analysis.md §Environmental).

4. NATO Partners (Washington, Berlin, Vilnius, Helsinki)

• Frame: Reliability of Swedish commitments; defence-spending floor; eFP rotations; intelligence-sharing.
• Strategic interest: 2% defence floor maintained; aspiration toward 3% (NATO 2025 summit signalling).
• Insulation: NATO commitments not coalition-contingent; very likely (75–90% [cycle]) preserved.

5. Economic Stakeholders (Riksbank, Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, FPR)

• Frame: Fiscal rule discipline; debt-to-GDP trajectory (IMF WEO 32.4% → 34.6% baseline); inflation target convergence.
• Strategic interest: Budget continuity post-election (FY2027 finalisation by Sep/Oct 2026); avoid caretaker fiscal drift (D2 leaf).
• Concerns: Coalition formation > 60 days; likely (60–75% [election]) some statslåneräntan widening if D-branch realised.

6. Civil Society / Watchdogs (Civil Rights Defenders, TI Sweden, KU)

• Frame: Constitutional accountability; KU-anmälan ledger; HD03267 / HD01JuU32 Lagrådet record.
• Strategic interest: Constitutional review preserved; transparency record.

Cross-Cutting Tension Points

• Tidö vs Opposition: Migration, fiscal redistribution, climate ambition.
• EU vs Opposition: HD01CU30 revisit risk.
• NATO vs Domestic: Defence-spending floor consensus (rare across blocs).
• Riksbank vs Government: Budget-rule discipline under any coalition.

Coalition Mathematics

Polling Anchor (2026-05 wave aggregate; Sifo / Novus / Demoskop) [A2]

Sum (midpoint): ~96.3%. Below-threshold residual (other parties + L if it slips): ~3.7%.

Bloc Math

• M+KD+L+SD: 47.6% (midpoint) → 163–188 seats (L-threshold sensitivity).
• S+MP+V+C: 48.7% (midpoint) → 169–192 seats (no threshold risk inside bloc).
• Majority threshold: 175 seats.

Threshold Sensitivity Analysis

Scenario X — L survives at 4.1%:

• Right bloc 178–185 seats; likely (60–70%) A1/A2/A3. Scenario Y — L slips to 3.6% (below threshold):
• L's votes redistribute via adjustment seats; M+KD+SD gain ~10 seats but lose L's 12–17 seats net; right bloc 165–175.
• Likely (60–70%) A2 scenario or D-branch. Scenario Z — C joins S-bloc on confidence:
• Right bloc unchanged ~178; S-bloc 169–192 (+C confidence) → 187–214.
• Very likely (75–85%) C1/C3 scenario.

Coalition Pathways (Majority = 175 seats)

Decision-Pivot Variables

1. L 4%-threshold survival: most-leveraged single variable. Roughly even (50–65% [election]) survival.
2. C coalition preference: undecided per public-position; likely (55–70%) signals before election.
3. SD cabinet entry willingness: likely (60–75%) signals before election; conditional on L outcome.

Adjustment-Seat Geography

Sweden's 29 valkretsar + 39 adjustment seats are central to threshold calculations. Stockholm (M urban core), Skåne (SD stronghold), Norrland (S+C overlap) are the decisive geographies.

[A2] Aggregated Sifo / Novus / Demoskop 2026-04 + 2026-05 waves.

Voter Segmentation

Segment Mapping (qualitative)

Right-bloc segments

• Urban-establishment M voters: 30+ employed homeowners; coalition preference: A1 / B1; vulnerability: B-pivot.
• Suburban SD-tilted voters: working/middle income; coalition preference: A1 / A2; decisive on L threshold.
• L core / liberal-urban: educated metropolitan; coalition preference: B1 strict; most at-risk segment for L threshold.
• KD value-conservative: religious + family-policy; durable across A/B branches.

Centre-bloc segments

• C rural / agrarian: coalition preference signal — likely (60–70% [election]) C-bloc tilt by Aug 2026; key swing.

Left-bloc segments

• S blue-collar / unionised: stable; coalition preference C1 / C3.
• MP urban-environmental: climate-priority; coalition preference C1.
• V working-class progressive: redistribution priority; coalition preference C1.

Decisive Swing Segments

1. L-threshold-bubble voters (~1.5% of electorate): determines A1 vs A2 split.
2. C-coalition-undecided (~2% of electorate): determines B vs C.
3. MP-threshold-bubble (~1% of electorate): secondary effect on C-cluster.

Geographic Concentration

• Stockholm: M / L / MP concentration; L threshold survival depends on urban turnout.
• Skåne: SD stronghold; KD secondary; demographic stability.
• Norrland: S / C overlap; C decisive on coalition framing.
• Göteborg: M / S / MP overlap; swing-region for adjustment seats.

Forward Indicators

T+72h (Short Horizon)

• FI-1 2026-05-15: SVT/SR polling wave 6 release.
• FI-2 2026-05-21: KU plenary disposition of 8 active anmälningar.
• FI-3 2026-05-22: Riksbank rate decision (statslåneräntan signal).

T+7d

• FI-4 2026-05-20: Sifo final wave before summer.
• FI-5 2026-05-19: HD01NU21 follow-on debate (rural framework signal).

T+30d

• FI-6 2026-06-12: KU follow-on plenary (carry-over).
• FI-7 2026-06-15: Riksdagen sommarstämma end; campaign-period commences.
• FI-8 2026-06-30: Konjunkturinstitutet half-year forecast.

T+90d

• FI-9 2026-08-15: Demoskop / Novus combined wave (decisive).
• FI-10 2026-08-28: SVT slutdebatt (final L-threshold test).
• FI-11 2026-09-13: Riksdagsval.

T+180d

• FI-12 2026-09-15: Talman procedure commences.
• FI-13 2026-10-15: Coalition-formation deadline trigger (60-day).
• FI-14 2026-11-15: FY2027 budget proposition deadline.

T+365d

• FI-15 2027-04-15: Lagrådet review of any A2 migration amendment.
• FI-16 2027-06-30: Konjunkturinstitutet annual review under new government.
• FI-17 2027-09-13: 1-year mandate review.

T+1460d (Mandate End)

• FI-18 2030-09-08: Next election (Cycle II rollover).

Indicator Quality

• Hard / dated: FI-1 through FI-14 (calendar events).
• Soft / event-conditional: FI-15 (depends on A2 leaf), FI-16, FI-17.
• Polling-driven: FI-1, FI-4, FI-9 (likely to drive narrative pivots).

Scenario Analysis

Tree depth: 4 base × 3 governing-coalition branches = 12 leaves. Wildcards: 5 named exogenous events (cross-ref wildcards-blackswans.md). Probabilities sum to 100% at every level. IMF anchoring: WEO Apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0 (vintage age 1 mo). Polling anchor: Sifo / Novus / Demoskop aggregated 2026-04 + 2026-05 waves [A2].

Tree Overview

2026-09-13 Riksdagsval (T+0)
├── A. Tidö continuation (M+KD(+L)+SD external/internal) — 32%
│   ├── A1: Full Tidö 2.0 (continuity; SD external) — 12.8%
│   ├── A2: Tidö without L (L < 4%; SD internal) — 11.2%
│   └── A3: Tidö + C security-only deal — 8.0%
├── B. Centre pivot (M+KD+L+C; SD excluded) — 18%
│   ├── B1: Clean centre majority — 7.2%
│   ├── B2: Centre + MP confidence supply — 5.4%
│   └── B3: Centre minority + S abstention — 5.4%
├── C. S-led red-green-centre — 28%
│   ├── C1: S+MP+V majority — 11.2%
│   ├── C2: S+MP minority + V external — 8.4%
│   └── C3: S-led with C inside cabinet — 8.4%
└── D. Hung parliament / extraordinary process — 22%
    ├── D1: Extraordinary election Q1-2027 — 8.8%
    ├── D2: Caretaker government 60+ days — 7.7%
    └── D3: Grand coalition M+S — 5.5%

Wildcards (additive overlays):
  W1 Russia escalation — 8% [18mo]
  W2 Severe fiscal shock (10y > 4.5%) — 6% [12mo]
  W3 Major KU-anmälan upheld during campaign — 12% [6mo]
  W4 L falls below 4% by polling-day — already conditioning A2/B/C branches
  W5 SD-leadership succession crisis — 9% [18mo]

Per-Leaf Analysis

A1 — Full Tidö 2.0 (12.8%) [horizon:cycle]

• Seats: M 65–75; KD 18–24; L 12–17; SD 65–75 (external support); blok 178–185.
• Implications: FY2027 budget = continuity baseline; HD03267 / HD01JuU32 / HD01JuU34 / HD01JuU39 enforcement continues; HD03250 e-ID rollout accelerated; HD01CU30 EU EED on track; defence-floor maintained.
• Very likely (75–85%) all 2027 implementation milestones funded.
• Risks: SD-cooperation fatigue in M base; KU-anmälan ledger lengthens; roughly even (40–55%) coalition cohesion challenge by 2028 mid-cycle.

A2 — Tidö without L; SD enters cabinet (11.2%)

• Trigger: L below 4% threshold on 2026-09-13.
• Seats: M 70–80; KD 20–26; SD 70–80 (internal); blok 180–188.
• Implications: SD enters cabinet for the first time; migration policy hardens; HD03267 amendment cycle triggered; roughly even (40–55%) Lagrådet rejects an A2-coalition migration amendment; HD01CU30 implementation slows; defence-floor sustained.
• Risks: Constitutional pressure rises sharply; likely (60–75%) at least one Lagrådet pre-review pushback by Q1-2027.

A3 — Tidö + C security-only deal (8.0%)

• Seats: M+KD+L 90–105; SD 65–75 external; C 18–24 (security pact only).
• Implications: HD01NU21 rural framework upgraded; SD external influence diluted; unlikely (20–35%) survives full mandate without crisis.

B1 — Clean centre majority (7.2%)

• Seats: M+KD+L+C 175–182 (excluded SD).
• Implications: HD03267 enforcement softens; HD01CU30 accelerated; HD03250 on schedule; FY2027 budget likely (60–70%) passes intact.

B2 — Centre + MP confidence supply (5.4%)

• Seats: M+KD+L+C 165–172 + MP confidence-supply.
• Implications: Climate ambition rises; EU EED 2030 building-stock tightened; security continuity maintained.

B3 — Centre minority + S abstention (5.4%)

• Unlikely (20–35%) lasts full mandate; very likely (75–85%) extraordinary election by 2028.

C1 — S-MP-V majority (11.2%)

• Seats: S+MP+V 175–185.
• Implications: HD01JuU32 reviewed (not repealed); HD03267 amended with legal-aid expansion; FY2027 budget = redistribution baseline; HD01CU30 accelerated; NATO obligations maintained (treaty-bound). HD10484 elderly-care / HD10486 equal-pay legislated within Q2-2027.
• Likely (60–70%) coalition formation < 60 days.

C2 — S-MP minority + V external (8.4%)

• Seats: S+MP 145–158; V external confidence-supply.
• Roughly even (40–55%) lasts full mandate.

C3 — S-led with C inside (8.4%)

• Seats: S+MP+C 165–178; V external.
• Implications: Climate ambition + rural framework reconciled; HD01NU21 enacted in revised form.

D1 — Extraordinary election Q1-2027 (8.8%)

• Trigger: Government formation fails by T+90d; talman procedure exhausted.
• Implications: Caretaker budget; Riksbank rate-cycle uncertainty rises; fiscal drift.

D2 — Caretaker government 60+ days (7.7%)

• Defence-spending floor maintained; EU obligations met; likely (60–70%) leads to D1 or A1/A2 outcome.

D3 — Grand coalition M+S (5.5%)

• Trigger: Russia escalation (W1 overlay) or severe fiscal shock (W2).
• Implications: SD excluded; constitutional package; defence-spending floor maintained or raised.

Probability Sensitivity

Pivot drivers (one-at-a-time perturbation):

• L drops below 4%: A1→A2 redistribution; B-branch impossible. Tree compresses to ~85% mass over A2/C/D.
• C joins S: C3 weight rises to ~12%; B-branch falls to ~10%.
• Russia escalation (W1) materialises: D3 weight rises to ~10%; A1/C1 split.

Cross-Reference

• Coalition arithmetic: coalition-mathematics.md.
• Wildcard distribution: wildcards-blackswans.md.
• Counterfactuals: devils-advocate.md.
• Forward indicators by horizon-band: cycle-trajectory.md.

[A2] Aggregated Sifo / Novus / Demoskop 2026-04 + 2026-05 waves; methodology in methodology-reflection.md.

Election 2026 Analysis

Anchor Event: 2026-09-13 Riksdagsval

This artifact is the next-cycle-perspective election analysis; the current-mandate retrospective lives at ../current/election-2026-analysis.md. Here we focus on what happens on/after election day.

Election-Day Probability Distribution

Rows sum to 100% with rounding (W4 already conditioning row 2).

Decision-Critical Election-Night Indicators

1. L vote share — single most-leveraged variable.
2. SD vote share — plurality vs second-position.
3. C vote share + coalition position — bloc allocation determinant.
4. Adjustment-seat allocation — driven by valkrets-level performance.
5. MP threshold survival — secondary to L but conditioning C-cluster.

Election-Day Operational Risk

• Cyber-event (BS-1): unlikely (5–10%); pre-positioned MSB readiness.
• Disinformation surge (T1c): roughly even (40–55% [election-week]); known FIM playbook.
• Foreign-influence operation: likely (60–70% [election-week]); known threat baseline.

Post-Election Process (Talman Procedure)

• T+0d: Election held.
• T+1–14d: Talman consultation begins.
• T+15d: First proposal for ministerpresident (typically).
• T+30d: First formal vote in Riksdagen.
• T+60d: Procedural pressure increases.
• T+90d: Caretaker rules kick in fully; D-cluster realised.

Historical Reference Patterns

• 2018: 131 days formation.
• 2022: ~58 days formation (Tidöavtalet).
• 2026 modal: likely (55–70% [election]) formation 30–90 days.

Cycle Trajectory

The 24th artifact for election-cycle. Plots key metric trajectories across horizon bands T+72h / T+7d / T+30d / T+90d / T+365d / T+1460d.

Horizon-Band Metrics (forward-looking, IMF-anchored)

Forecast Trajectory Curves

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    bar [32.4, 33.1, 33.8, 34.3, 34.6]
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Key Trajectory Inflections

• T+90d to T+180d: coalition-formation period; statslåneräntan + poll margins highly volatile.
• T+180d to T+365d: FY2027 budget pass-through; defence-floor consolidation.
• T+365d to T+730d: HD01CU30 EU EED mid-implementation; HD03250 e-ID Phase-2 operational.
• T+730d to T+1460d: NATO 3% pressure cycle; FY2030 budget; mandate-end transition.

Cross-Reference to Long-Horizon Forecasting

Per ext/long-horizon-forecasting.md requirements:

• ≥ 15 dated forward indicators: ✓ (see forward-indicators.md)
• 12-leaf scenario tree: ✓ (see scenario-analysis.md)
• Horizon-band stratification: ✓ (this artifact)
• Wildcard overlay: ✓ (see wildcards-blackswans.md)
• WEP estimative language: ✓ (consistent across all artifacts)

Risk Assessment

Per risk-assessment-frameworks skill.

Risk Register (top 12 by composite score)

Composite = midpoint of likelihood band × impact / 100.

Risk Heat Map (Mermaid)

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quadrantChart
    title Post-2026 risk heat map
    x-axis Low likelihood --> High likelihood
    y-axis Low impact --> High impact
    quadrant-1 High impact / High likelihood
    quadrant-2 High impact / Low likelihood
    quadrant-3 Low impact / Low likelihood
    quadrant-4 Low impact / High likelihood
    R1 — Coalition delay: [0.50, 0.80]
    R2 — A2 / SD entry: [0.45, 0.80]
    R4 — EU statute revisit: [0.65, 0.60]
    R9 — NATO 3% pressure: [0.65, 0.60]
    R5 — Russia escalation: [0.10, 0.95]
    R6 — Fiscal shock: [0.08, 0.95]
    R3 — KU upheld: [0.15, 0.80]
    R11 — Cyber: [0.10, 0.95]
    R10 — Lagrådet: [0.45, 0.60]

Tail-Risk Concentration

• High-impact / low-likelihood tail (R5 / R6 / R11): summed unconditional probability ~18–22% over 18 months but each individually < 10%. Tail-overlay drives ~10 pp of D-branch probability.
• Decision-impact tail: R1 (coalition delay) + R4 (EU revisit) are the medium-probability / medium-impact backbone that drives the realistic operational risk envelope.

Mitigation Hooks

• R1: Pre-positioned caretaker fiscal protocol; Konjunkturinstitutet emergency forecast.
• R2: Lagrådet pre-review prioritisation under A2.
• R4: Pre-negotiated EU transitional provisions during coalition formation.
• R5/R6: NATO eFP standby; Riksbank facility readiness.

SWOT Analysis

Quantitative variant: quantitative-swot.md.

Strengths (institutional)

• Strong constitutional framework (Regeringsformen, Vallagen).
• Mature multi-bloc politics; no party near 35%.
• Riksbank + ESV + Konjunkturinstitutet provide fiscal discipline scaffolding.
• NATO membership stabilises defence floor across coalitions.

Weaknesses

• L 4% threshold structural weakness.
• C coalition-preference ambiguity creates seat-allocation uncertainty.
• SD cabinet-entry untested; Lagrådet pressure unknown.
• Coalition-formation process lacks deadline force; > 60 days possible.

Opportunities

• Constitutional moment to reform talman procedure if D-branch realised.
• EU-policy continuity strong across blocs (HD01CU30, HD01FiU38).
• Cross-bloc consensus on NATO and defence floor.

Threats

• Russia escalation (W1) during formation window.
• Severe fiscal shock (W2) constraining budget.
• Coalition cohesion crisis post-formation.

Strategic Implication

The structural strength of Swedish institutions absorbs coalition-formation friction; even a 60-day delay does not cascade to constitutional crisis. Decision-level operational risk lives in fiscal / EU / NATO continuity, not democratic-process integrity.

Quantitative SWOT

Composite scoring: S = 8.5 (avg); W = 6.0 (avg); O = 7.0 (avg); T = 5.3 (avg).

Net structural posture: moderate-strong; institutional strengths outweigh decision-pivot weaknesses across most leaves.

Threat Analysis

Per threat-modeling + STRIDE-adapted-for-politics methodology (see political-stride-assessment.md for the STRIDE table).

Threat Classes (per stakeholder)

Class T1 — Democratic-Process Integrity Threats

• T1a: Election infrastructure cyber-event (BS-1 in wildcards-blackswans.md).
• T1b: Foreign-information operation targeting late-campaign volatility.
• T1c: Disinformation campaign on coalition-formation legitimacy.

Class T2 — Constitutional / Rule-of-Law Threats

• T2a: A2 (SD-in-cabinet) Lagrådet conflict on HD03267 amendments.
• T2b: Caretaker-government overreach (D2 leaf).
• T2c: KU-anmälan ledger dysfunction during transition.

Class T3 — Coalition-Stability Threats

• T3a: SD-leadership succession crisis (W5).
• T3b: L-threshold failure cascading to Tidö dissolution.
• T3c: C cross-bloc defection mid-mandate.

Class T4 — Fiscal / Macro Threats

• T4a: Statslåneräntan widening on coalition delay.
• T4b: FY2027 budget pass-through delay.
• T4c: Riksbank rate-cycle policy mistake.

Class T5 — Geopolitical Threats

• T5a: Russia escalation during campaign / formation window.
• T5b: NATO 3% pressure across coalitions.
• T5c: EU EED 2030 compliance friction.

Threat-Likelihood Matrix

Attack Surfaces (political-STRIDE)

See political-stride-assessment.md for full STRIDE-mapped table.

Political STRIDE Assessment

Adapted from threat-modeling STRIDE framework for political integrity.

STRIDE-Political Threat Matrix

Cross-Mapping to Wildcards / Black-Swans

• Spoofing + T1b → election-window FIM operations.
• Tampering + BS-1 → election-infrastructure cyber-event.
• Elevation of Privilege + D2 → caretaker overreach scenario.

Structural Defences

• Constitutional firewalls (Regeringsformen, KU oversight).
• Operational redundancy (Riksbank, ESV, Konjunkturinstitutet).
• Information operational defences (MSB, FRA, civil-society watchdogs).

Wildcards & Black Swans

Per intelligence-analysis-techniques skill + ICD 203 [B] sourcing.

Named Wildcards (5 mandatory)

W1 — Russia escalation forcing emergency coalition formation (8% [18mo])

• Trigger: Kinetic / hybrid Russian action against Sweden or Baltic NATO ally requiring article-4 / article-5 consultation.
• Impact: D3 grand-coalition probability rises ~3 pp; defence-spending floor breached upward to 2.5% GDP; FY2027 supplementary budget very likely (75–85%).
• Indicators: NATO eFP rotation accelerations; SAEPA / FRA threat-level rises.

W2 — Severe fiscal shock — Swedish 10y > 4.5% (6% [12mo])

• Trigger: Riksbank policy mistake; global recession; eurozone crisis.
• Impact: FY2027 budget renegotiation; likely (60–70%) cross-bloc deal on emergency package; rate-cycle compression.
• Indicators: IMF WEO downside scenario triggered; statslåneräntan auctions failing.

W3 — Major KU-anmälan upheld during campaign (12% [6mo])

• Trigger: KU plenary 2026-05-21 disposition of pending 8 anmälningar; or pre-election scandal.
• Impact: A-scenarios -2 pp; likely (60–70%) shift to B or C branch.
• Indicators: KU follow-on plenary scheduling.

W4 — L falls below 4% threshold (50–65% [election])

• Status: Already CONDITIONING tree weights at branch level (A2 leaf prices in).
• Impact: A1 → A2 pivot; B-scenario impossible without L; likely (60–70%) coalition formation > 60 days.
• Indicators: Sifo / Novus / Demoskop wave 6 / 7 (Aug 2026); SVT slutdebatt L performance.

W5 — SD leadership succession crisis (9% [18mo])

• Trigger: Internal party succession; Jimmie Åkesson departure post-election.
• Impact: A-scenarios destabilise; coalition cohesion crisis; roughly even (40–55%) D-branch triggered.
• Indicators: SD partistämma scheduling; internal faction signalling.

Black-Swan Tails (3 mandatory)

BS-1 — Cyber-event compromising 2026-09-13 election infrastructure

• Unlikely (5–10%) but high-impact.
• Impact: Constitutional crisis; election re-run constitutionally complex; D-branch overwhelming probability mass.
• Indicators: MSB / FRA threat reports; CIA-equivalent foreign threat warning.

BS-2 — Climate emergency declaration (Sweden) during campaign

• Unlikely (5–10%) but politically transformative.
• Trigger: Wildfire / flood event mid-Aug 2026.
• Impact: MP / V polling +2 to +3 pp; HD01CU30 reinterpreted as emergency action; likely (60–70%) C-branch tilt.

BS-3 — Eurozone-wide debt crisis spillover

• Unlikely (5–10%) over [12mo].
• Trigger: Italian / French sovereign-spread blow-out.
• Impact: W2 amplified; Riksbank constrained; ECB-coordination pressure.

Aggregate Tail Probability

Sum of mutually exclusive tail outcomes (W1 ∪ W2 ∪ W3 minus correlations) ≈ 22–26% over 12-month horizon. This explains why scenario-D ("hung / extraordinary") at 22% is substantially priced by tail-overlay, not by base outcome.

Mitigation Levers

• Constitutional: Talman procedure extended-deadline rules; caretaker fiscal rules.
• Fiscal: Riksbank facility; statslåneräntan defence; Konjunkturinstitutet emergency forecast.
• Security: NATO eFP commitments; SAEPA continuity; defence-spending floor.
• Information: SVT / SR election-night protocol; MSB cyber-readiness drill (Q2-2026 scheduled).

PESTLE Analysis

Political

• Tidö-bloc cohesion: high during 2022–2026; likely (60–75% [election]) tested by L threshold and SD-internal-cabinet question.
• Opposition coordination: S–MP–V three-party negotiation easier than B-branch four-party.
• Constitutional resilience: high; institutional buffers strong.

Economic

• IMF WEO Apr-2026 [A1] [horizon:cycle]: GGXWDG_NGDP 32.4% (2026) → 34.6% (2030); real GDP 1.6% (2026) → 2.1% (2028).
• Riksbank rate cycle: inflection likely (60–70%) Q3-2026.
• Statslåneräntan: 10y near 2.8%; widening risk unlikely (15–25%) absent W2.
• Fiscal-rule pressure: structural surplus target preserved; D-leaf risk on caretaker drift.

Social

• Migration: HD03267 amendments under A2 reshape integration framework.
• Healthcare: HD10484 elderly-care platform plank; cross-bloc consensus on capacity.
• Equal pay: HD10486 platform plank under C-scenarios.

Technological

• HD03250 e-ID Phase-2 rollout: cross-bloc durability ≥ 9.
• Cyber-readiness (BS-1 mitigation): MSB capacity ongoing.
• AI governance: EU AI Act transposition; cross-bloc continuity very likely.

Legal

• Lagrådet pressure: highest under A2 leaf; roughly even (40–55%) pushback on HD03267 amendments.
• EU compliance: HD01CU30 / HD01FiU38 binding; opposition motions likely (60–70% [cycle]).
• Constitutional review: KU-anmälan disposition cycle.

Environmental

• EU EED 2030 building-stock: HD01CU30 follow-on legislation binding through 2030.
• Climate ambition: bloc-contingent; C-scenarios accelerate.
• Wildfire / flood risk (BS-2 trigger): unlikely (5–10% [12mo]).

Historical Parallels

1998–2006: "Three Pairs" S minority with V+MP confidence

• Pattern: minority government + external confidence supply.
• Parallel to 2026: C2 / C3 leaves resemble this configuration.
• Lesson: Sustainable for full mandate if budget cooperation predictable.

2006–2014: Alliance majority/minority

• Pattern: M+KD+L+C four-party Alliance; majority 2006–2010, minority 2010–2014.
• Parallel: B1 leaf is direct revival of Alliance template.
• Lesson: Centre-coalition viable when SD excluded as deliberate strategy.

2014–2022: S+MP minority with Decemberöverenskommelse / January-agreement

• Pattern: cross-bloc procedural agreement enabling minority governance.
• Parallel: B3 (centre minority + S abstention) draws on this template.
• Lesson: Procedural innovation can bridge polarised seat-arithmetic.

2022–2026: Tidö government — first M+KD+L+SD-external arrangement

• Pattern: SD as supporting non-cabinet party with formal Tidöavtalet.
• Parallel: A1 leaf is continuity of this exact arrangement.
• Lesson: SD-external precedent now institutionally tested.

What Changed Across Cycles

• 2010: M+KD+L+C minority extended Alliance via January 2010 framework.
• 2014: 8-party fragmentation; first 4% threshold near-misses (FP/L at 5.4%).
• 2018: 4-month formation; first cross-bloc Decemberöverenskommelse-style deal.
• 2022: SD-as-king-maker for first time; Tidöavtalet codifies external support.

Likely 2026–2030 Pattern (forecast)

Most-modal pattern: A1 or C1 with A2 / B / D as plausible non-modal alternatives. The post-2026 mandate very likely (75–85% [cycle]) operates under a procedural framework drawn from the 1998–2022 template library, not a constitutional novelty.

Comparative International

Per comparative-politics-reporting skill.

Case 1: Germany 2017 (T+131 days to coalition)

• Bundestagswahl 2017-09-24; cabinet formation 2018-03-14.
• Mode: Jamaica negotiations fail; GroKo realised after second attempt.
• Sweden analogue: D2 leaf (caretaker 60+ days) → eventual A2 or C-branch.
• Lesson: Caretaker fiscal drift is manageable if rules clear; coalition friction can extend > 100 days.

Case 2: Netherlands 2021 (T+299 days)

• Tweede Kamer 2021-03-17; cabinet sworn 2022-01-10.
• Mode: Repeated negotiation rounds; informateur shuttle.
• Sweden analogue: D1 / D2 if multiple negotiating rounds.
• Lesson: Talman procedure does not bind on time; needs procedural reform for tighter deadlines.

Case 3: Belgium 2010–2011 (T+541 days)

• Outlier; rules of coalition formation more complex.
• Sweden analogue: Extreme tail risk; unlikely (5–10%) in Swedish context due to constitutional pressure mechanisms.

Case 4: Sweden 2018 (T+131 days)

• Riksdagsval 2018-09-09; Löfven government 2019-01-21.
• Mode: Decemberöverenskommelse precedent; cross-bloc cooperation.
• Lesson: 4-month formation is historically possible; institutional resilience demonstrated.

Case 5: Finland 2023 (T+72 days)

• Eduskuntavaalit 2023-04-02; Orpo cabinet 2023-06-20.
• Mode: Rapid formation; comparable Nordic political culture.
• Sweden analogue: A1 leaf if rapid signalling materialises.

Comparative Lessons for Sweden 2026

1. Caretaker fiscal protocols are essential — both Germany and Netherlands maintained budget continuity under extended formation.
2. Procedural reform precedent — Decemberöverenskommelse (Sweden 2014) shows cross-bloc cooperation is institutionally possible.
3. Speed correlates with prior signalling — Finland 2023 demonstrates pre-election clarity reduces formation time.
4. Belgium is the tail — Sweden's constitutional pressure mechanisms make > 200 day formation unlikely (5–10%).

Implementation Feasibility

Cross-Scenario Durability Score (1–10)

Implementation Risk by Class

• Treaty-bound (NATO / EU): durability ≥ 9 across all leaves.
• Recently-enacted statute: durability 8–10 (statutory inertia).
• Bloc-contingent policy: durability 5–7 (subject to FY2027 budget pivot).
• Mid-mandate proposals: durability 3–6 (high-uncertainty).

Specific Feasibility Indicators

• HD01CU30 EU EED: 2028 building-stock reporting deadline binds any government.
• HD01FiU38 EU clearing: Q4-2026 operational requirement.
• HD03250 e-ID Phase-2: Statutory pre-funding through FY2027 already enacted.
• HD03267 amendments: A2-leaf-conditional; Lagrådet pre-review filter.

Resource Constraints

• Riksbank capacity: rate-cycle inflection demands operational continuity; very likely (90%+).
• MSB capacity: cyber-readiness drill Q2-2026 ongoing; sustainable across leaves.
• Försvarsmakten: defence-floor sustainability requires 3% NATO target absorbed; roughly even (45–55%) cross-bloc consensus emerges by 2027.

Media Framing Analysis

Frame Inventory (anticipated)

"Stability vs Change" frame (Tidö-leaning media)

• Anchors: A1 / A2 leaves; mandate-fulfilment scorecard from 2022–2026.
• Counter-frame: Opposition charges of accountability gaps.

"Restoration" frame (S-leaning media)

• Anchors: C-cluster leaves; HD10483 / HD10484 / HD10486 platform planks.
• Counter-frame: Tidö-bloc charges of fiscal irresponsibility.

"Constitutional accountability" frame (cross-bloc, civil society)

• Anchors: KU-anmälan ledger; HD03267 / HD01JuU32 Lagrådet record; HD03250 oversight.

"Coalition-formation uncertainty" frame (media outside party-bloc)

• Anchors: D-cluster outcomes; talman procedure; caretaker risk.

Framing Cycle Forecast

• T-90d to T-30d (Jun–Aug 2026): Stability vs Change dominant; KU disposition shapes secondary frames.
• T-30d to T-0 (Aug–Sep 2026): Constitutional and coalition-formation frames rise.
• T+0 to T+90d (Sep–Dec 2026): Coalition-formation uncertainty becomes dominant; framing weight shifts with leaf realisation.

Information-Integrity Risks

• Foreign-information ops (T1b): historic baseline; specific to migration / NATO narratives.
• Disinformation on election infrastructure (T1c): elevated risk in T-30 to T+30d window.
• Algorithmic amplification: platform-level concentration on coalition-formation drama.

Devil's Advocate

Per intelligence-analysis-techniques Devil's Advocacy + ACH.

Counterfactual CA-1: "Tidö wipes out — clean S+MP+V majority"

Premise: SD polling collapses 5 pp; L below threshold; M down to 14%; C joins S-bloc decisively. Outcome: C1 leaf realises at ~25% probability (vs 11.2% base); A-cluster compresses to ~15%. Triggers: W3 KU-anmälan upheld during campaign with M / KD / SD-aligned scandal; W5 SD succession crisis pre-election. Implication: HD03267 / HD01JuU32 enforcement softens substantially; HD10483 / HD10484 enacted Q1-2027; HD01CU30 accelerated; FY2027 budget = redistribution baseline. Falsifier: SVT slutdebatt L performance + Sifo final wave; if L > 4.5% by 2026-08-28, CA-1 falsified.

Counterfactual CA-2: "SD plurality dominates — Tidö 2.0 strengthens"

Premise: SD polling rises 3 pp post-campaign; L survives threshold; M holds at 18%; SD becomes plurality. Outcome: A1 leaf realises at ~22% (vs 12.8% base); SD claims first-mandate cabinet portfolios. Triggers: W1 Russia escalation during campaign; security narrative dominates. Implication: Defence-spending floor rises to 2.5–3% GDP; HD03267 amendments accelerate; HD01CU30 implementation slows. Falsifier: Demoskop / Novus wave 6 / 7 showing SD < 19%; if SD < 18% by 2026-08-15, CA-2 falsified.

Counterfactual CA-3: "Hung-parliament chronic — D-cluster dominates"

Premise: Coalition-formation fails twice; D2 leaf realises; caretaker beyond 90 days; extraordinary election Q1-2027. Outcome: D-cluster aggregate rises to ~38% (vs 22% base); fiscal drift; statslåneräntan widens 30–50 bp. Triggers: W2 fiscal shock; W3 KU-anmälan disposition forcing recusal cycles; W5 SD succession during formation window. Implication: Constitutional pressure for talman-procedure reform; D3 grand coalition becomes residual probability ~10%. Falsifier: Initial coalition signalling within 14 days of 2026-09-13; if talman-led negotiation closes by 2026-09-27, CA-3 falsified.

Counterfactual CA-4 (bonus): "Climate-emergency-driven C+MP+V landslide"

Premise: BS-2 climate emergency declaration during campaign reshapes voter priorities. Outcome: MP polling +4 pp; V polling +2 pp; C tilts toward S-bloc. Falsifier: Absence of wildfire / flood event by 2026-08-15.

ACH Matrix Summary

Classification Results

Per Hack23 CLASSIFICATION.md framework. All artifacts in this folder: PUBLIC (CIA L1 / RTO 24h / RPO 24h).

Source-Vintage Audit

GDPR Impact

• No personal data processed beyond named public officials acting in public capacity (politicians, KU members, government ministers).
• DPIA short-circuit: per GDPR Art. 6(1)(e) — public-interest political accountability.

Classification per Artifact

All artifacts in this folder labelled PUBLIC with no derogations.

Cross-Reference Map

Bidirectional Anchors

dok_id Cross-References (≥10 required)

Methodology Reflection & Limitations

Analytical Standards Applied

• ICD 203 [A1–C3 sourcing]; ICD 206 for analytical caveats.
• Structured Analytic Techniques: Devil's Advocacy (devils-advocate.md), ACH, Key-Assumption Check (intelligence-assessment.md §Key Assumptions Check), Scenario Trees (scenario-analysis.md 12 leaves).
• Estimative Language: WEP probability ladder (very unlikely 1–10% → almost certain 90–99%) with [horizon:cycle/election] tagging.

Polling Triangulation

Sifo / Novus / Demoskop 2026-04 + 2026-05 waves; aggregate via inverse-variance weighted mean. Methodology consistent since 2022. Aggregate variance < 1.5 pp at 95% CI.

Tree-Construction Rules

• 4 base × 3 coalition branches = 12 leaves.
• Mutually exclusive at leaf level; probabilities sum to 100% at each node.
• Wildcards = independent overlays (additive, not redistributive at leaf level).

Confidence Calibration

We apply Tetlock-style calibration: forecast probabilities are intended to be frequency-grade, not subjective certainty. Post-event re-anchoring per pir-status.json updates.

Sources of Forecast Uncertainty

1. Polling vintage volatility (Sifo / Novus / Demoskop wave-to-wave) — ±1.5 pp.
2. Late-cycle event volatility (KU disposition, SD signals) — discrete 3–5 pp impacts.
3. Coalition signalling latency — public-position-disclosure timing not predictable.
4. External shocks (W1–W5 wildcards) — independent tail-events.

What Would Change Forecast Materially

• L-threshold survival probability moving outside [40, 70] pp range.
• SD polling moving outside [17, 22] pp range.
• C public coalition-preference declaration.
• Major external shock (Russia / fiscal / scandal) within 30 days.

Reproducibility

All forecast probabilities are derived from:

• Sainte-Laguë math on aggregate poll midpoints + 4%-threshold sensitivity.
• Coalition-formation precedent from comparative-international.md + historical-parallels.md.
• Tail-risk overlay per wildcards-blackswans.md.

Re-running this analysis with updated polling vintage will shift leaf probabilities within ±5 pp at the leaf level (±2 pp at cluster level) over a 30-day forward window.

AI-FIRST Iteration Log

• Pass 1 (created): scenario tree, 12 leaves, wildcards W1–W5, 3 counterfactuals, integrated synthesis-summary.
• Pass 2 (re-read + improved): tightened probability bands per ICD-203 grading, added cross-references between leaves and wildcards (W4 conditioning A2), expanded comparative parallels (DE 2017, NL 2021, BE 2010, SE 2018, FI 2023), enriched historical parallels with cross-cycle lessons, calibrated forward indicators to 15 dated events.
• Improvement-mode: confidence bands re-anchored to Tetlock-style frequency-grade; estimative language standardised.

Re-run log

• Re-run: 2026-05-18T10:00:16Z · workflow=News: Election Cycle · run_id=25853704629 · attempt=1
  • anchor: next
  • new dok_ids: none (improvement-mode bootstrap from 2026-05-18 baseline)
  • artifacts extended: synthesis-summary, executive-brief, article.md re-aggregated for 2026-05-18 horizon (T+1y=2027-05, T+5y=2031-05)
  • flags closed: 0
  • vintage refresh: IMF WEO Apr-2026 still current (no new vintage available)

Data Download Manifest

Sources Consulted

Provenance Block

This forecast operates on the corpus produced by the parent news-election-cycle run that built ../current/. No additional live MCP queries in this incremental forward-build (forecast is methodology-driven, not corpus-expansion-driven).

Executive Brief Ar

title: "الملخص التنفيذي — توقعات الولاية بعد 2026 (الدورة/التالية)"

language: ar subfolder: election-cycle/next

workflow: news-election-cycle horizon: cycle

الملخص التنفيذي — توقعات الولاية بعد 2026

الخلاصة المباشرة (BLUF)

احتمال متساوٍ تقريباً (45–55% [horizon:election]) أن تُسفر انتخابات ريكسداغ بتاريخ 2026-09-13 عن نتيجة برلمان معلّق تستلزم أكثر من 30 يوماً لتشكيل الائتلاف. المتغير البنيوي الحاسم هو بقاء حزب L فوق عتبة الأربعة بالمئة (حالياً متساوٍ تقريباً 50–65%; مستبعد 30–45% أن يتجاوز L نسبة 5%)؛ أما المتغير الثانوي فهو تفضيل الائتلاف لدى حزب C (الوسط مقابل الوسط اليساري-الأخضر بقيادة S).

ثلاثة استنتاجات محورية للدورة (نظرة مستقبلية)

1. استمرار اتفاقية تيدو في ظل دعم M+KD(+L)+SD هو النتيجة الأكثر شيوعاً ولكن الأقلية (32% على أوراق A1/A2/A3). ضمن السيناريو A، على الأرجح (60–70%) تهيمن A2 (تيدو بدون L) إذا انخفض L عن 4%.
2. الحكم الأخضر-الأحمر بقيادة S (28% على C1/C2/C3) هو الكتلة الثانية الأكثر احتمالاً، مع C1 (أغلبية S-MP-V) كورقة C الأكثر شيوعاً بنسبة 11.2%.
3. نتائج البرلمان المعلّق (22%) تحمل خطر متساوٍ تقريباً (40–55%) حكومة تصريف أعمال لمدة 60+ يوماً، وخطر مستبعد (15–25%) اقتراع خارج الدورة في الربع الأول من 2027.

لماذا يهمّ الأمر الآن (مايو 2026)

• التموضع في نهاية الولاية من قبل المعارضة (HD10483 قانون الموافقة، HD10484 رعاية المسنين، HD10485 ضريبة الدعارة، HD10486 المساواة في الأجور، HD01NU21 الإطار الريفي) يشير إلى بناء منصات حملات انتخابية؛ على الأرجح (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) ستظهر هذه بوصفها ركائز ائتلاف حاكم في أي سيناريو C.
• تنظيف متأخرات الامتثال للاتحاد الأوروبي من قِبَل الائتلاف المنتهي ولايته (HD01CU30 EPBD، HD01FiU38 للمقاصة) — تكتسب الحكومة القادمة مخاطر انتهاك قريبة من الصفر لكن ملكية سياسية محدودة.
• صندوق النقد الدولي WEO أبريل 2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: المسار السويدي مستقر؛ GGXWDG_NGDP 32.4% (2026) → 34.6% (2030) كخط أساسي؛ مخاطر هبوطية مستبعدة (20–35%) في سيناريو الصدمة المالية.

أبرز 3 مخاطر (ما بعد 2026)

أبرز 3 أحداث طارئة (مخاطر قصوى)

• W1 التصعيد الروسي يُجبر على تشكيل ائتلاف طوارئ: 8% [18mo]
• W3 KU-anmälan كبير مستمر خلال الحملة: 12% [6mo]
• W5 أزمة خلافة قيادة SD بين الإعلان و2027: 9% [18mo]

التوزيع الكامل في wildcards-blackswans.md.

نقاط القرار لأصحاب المصلحة

• الجهات الميزانية (Konjunkturinstitutet، ESV، finanspolitiska rådet): التخطيط لـسيناريو تأخير ميزانية من 30 إلى 60 يوماً باحتمال على الأرجح (60–75% [election]) في أي ورقة غير A1.
• شركاء الاتحاد الأوروبي المؤسسيون: توقّع على الأرجح (60–70% [cycle]) اقتراحات معارضة بشأن جداول تنفيذ HD01CU30 في سيناريوهات C.
• شركاء الناتو: أرضية الإنفاق الدفاعي مرجّحة جداً (75–90% [cycle]) مستدامة؛ التزامات الناتو غير مرتبطة بالائتلاف.

مسار القراءة

1. scenario-analysis.md — شجرة 12 ورقة، تحليل الاحتمالات.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — توزيع المقاعد وفق Sainte-Laguë حسب موجة الاستطلاع.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 بطاقات جوكر + 3 أحداث طارئة.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — مقاييس النطاق متعدد السنوات (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — العوامل البنيوية حسب السيناريو.

[A1] صندوق النقد الدولي WEO أبريل 2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0؛ [A2] Sifo/Novus/Demoskop مجمّعة أبريل–مايو 2026.

Executive Brief Da

BLUF (Konklusion på forhånd)

Tilnærmelsesvis lige muligheder (45–55% [horizon:election]) for at Riksdagsvalget 2026-09-13 giver et parlamentsresultat, der kræver > 30 dages koalitionsforhandling. Den afgørende strukturelle variabel er L's overlevelse af fireprocentsgrænsen (i øjeblikket omtrent lige 50–65%; usandsynligt 30–45% at L overstiger 5%); den sekundære variabel er C's koalitionspræference (center vs S-ledet rødgrøn-center).

Tre cykeldefinierende konklusioner (fremadrettet)

1. Tidö-fortsættelse under M+KD(+L)+SD-støtte er det modale men minoritets-resultat (32% over A1/A2/A3-bladene). Inden for Scenarie A dominerer sandsynligvis (60–70%) A2 (Tidö uden L) hvis L glider under 4%.
2. S-ledet rødgrøn-center-styring (28% over C1/C2/C3) er det næst mest sandsynlige kluster, med C1 (S-MP-V-flertal) som det modale C-blad på 11,2%.
3. Hængt parlaments-resultater (22%) bærer en omtrent lige (40–55%) forretningsministeriums-risiko på 60+ dage, og en usandsynlig (15–25%) ekstraordinær valgudløser i Q1-2027.

Hvorfor det er vigtigt nu (maj 2026)

• Sen-mandatpositionering af opposition (HD10483 samtykkeloven, HD10484 ældrepleje, HD10485 prostitutionsbeskatning, HD10486 ligeløn, HD01NU21 landdistriktspolitik) signalerer kampagneplatformskonstruktion; sandsynligvis (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) at disse dukker op som styringskoalitionsplanker under ethvert C-scenarie.
• EU-overholdelsesbunkerensning af afgående koalition (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 clearing) — den indkommende regering arver nul-overtrædelsesrisiko men begrænset politisk ejerskab.
• IMF WEO apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: Sveriges bane stabil; GGXWDG_NGDP 32,4% (2026) → 34,6% (2030) baseline; nedsidesrisiko usandsynlig (20–35%) ved finansielt chok-scenarie.

Top-3 risici (efter 2026)

Top-3 sorte svaner (ekstreme risici)

• W1 Ruslandseskalation tvinger nødkoalitionsdannelse: 8% [18mo]
• W3 Stor KU-anmälan opretholdt under kampagnen: 12% [6mo]
• W5 SD-ledervalskrise mellem annoncering og 2027: 9% [18mo]

Fuld fordeling i wildcards-blackswans.md.

Beslutningspunkter for interessenter

• Budgetsidensaktører (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): planlæg for 30–60 dages budgetforsinkelsesSCENARIE med sandsynligvis (60–75% [election]) sandsynlighed under ethvert ikke-A1-blad.
• EU-institutionelle partnere: forvent sandsynligvis (60–70% [cycle]) oppositionsmotioner om HD01CU30-implementeringstidslinjer under C-scenarier.
• NATO-partnere: forsvarsspendings golv meget sandsynligt (75–90% [cycle]) holdbart; NATO-forpligtelser ikke koalitionsafhængige.

Læsevej

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12-bladstræ, sandsynlighedsdekomposition.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — Sainte-Laguë mandatfordelinger pr. meningsmålingstappning.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 jokerkort + 3 sorte svanar.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — fleridig horisontbåndsmålinger (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — strukturelle drivere pr. scenarie.

[A1] IMF WEO apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Aggregerede Sifo/Novus/Demoskop apr–maj 2026.

Executive Brief De

BLUF (Kernaussage)

Ungefähr ausgeglichen (45–55% [horizon:election]), dass die Reichstagswahl 2026-09-13 ein hängendes Parlamentsergebnis mit > 30 Tagen Koalitionsbildung ergibt. Die entscheidende strukturelle Variable ist L's Überleben der Vier-Prozent-Hürde (derzeit ungefähr ausgeglichen 50–65%; unwahrscheinlich 30–45%, dass L 5% überschreitet); die sekundäre Variable ist C's Koalitionspräferenz (Mitte vs S-geführte rot-grün-Mitte).

Drei zyklusdefinierende Erkenntnisse (vorwärts)

1. Tidö-Fortsetzung unter M+KD(+L)+SD-Unterstützung ist das modale aber Minderheits-Ergebnis (32% über A1/A2/A3-Blätter). Innerhalb von Szenario A dominiert wahrscheinlich (60–70%) A2 (Tidö ohne L), wenn L unter 4% rutscht.
2. S-geführte rot-grün-Mitte-Regierung (28% über C1/C2/C3) ist das zweitwahrscheinlichste Cluster, mit C1 (S-MP-V-Mehrheit) als modales C-Blatt bei 11,2%.
3. Hängendes Parlament-Ergebnisse (22%) tragen ein ungefähr ausgeglichenes (40–55%) Geschäftsregierungsrisiko von 60+ Tagen und einen unwahrscheinlichen (15–25%) Außerordentliche-Wahl-Auslöser bis Q1-2027.

Warum das jetzt wichtig ist (Mai 2026)

• Spät-Mandat-Positionierung der Opposition (HD10483 Zustimmungsgesetz, HD10484 Seniorenpflege, HD10485 Prostitutionsbesteuerung, HD10486 Lohngleichheit, HD01NU21 Ländlicher Rahmen) signalisiert Wahlplattformkonstruktion; wahrscheinlich (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) werden diese als Regierungskoalitionssäulen unter jedem C-Szenario auftauchen.
• EU-Konformitätsrückstandsbereinigung durch ausscheidende Koalition (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 Clearing) — die einkommende Regierung erbt nahezu null Vertragsverletzungsrisiko, aber begrenztes politisches Eigentum.
• IMF WEO Apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: Schwedens Bahn stabil; GGXWDG_NGDP 32,4% (2026) → 34,6% (2030) Basislinie; Abwärtsrisiko unwahrscheinlich (20–35%) bei fiskalischem Schockszenario.

Top-3 Risiken (nach 2026)

Top-3 Schwarze Schwäne (Extremrisiken)

• W1 Russland-Eskalation erzwingt Notkoalitionsbildung: 8% [18mo]
• W3 Große KU-anmälan während Kampagne aufrechterhalten: 12% [6mo]
• W5 SD-Führungsnachfolgekrise zwischen Ankündigung und 2027: 9% [18mo]

Vollständige Verteilung in wildcards-blackswans.md.

Entscheidungspunkte für Stakeholder

• Haushaltsseitige Akteure (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): planen für 30–60 Tage Budgetverzögerungsszenario mit wahrscheinlich (60–75% [election]) Wahrscheinlichkeit unter jedem Nicht-A1-Blatt.
• EU-institutionelle Partner: antizipieren wahrscheinlich (60–70% [cycle]) Oppositionsmotionen zu HD01CU30-Umsetzungszeitplänen unter C-Szenarien.
• NATO-Partner: Verteidigungsausgaben-Minimum sehr wahrscheinlich (75–90% [cycle]) dauerhaft; NATO-Verpflichtungen nicht koalitionsabhängig.

Lesepfad

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12-Blatt-Baum, Wahrscheinlichkeitszerlegung.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — Sainte-Laguë-Mandatszuteilungen nach Umfragevintage.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 Joker + 3 Schwarze Schwäne.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — Mehrjährige Horizontband-Metriken (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — Strukturelle Treiber pro Szenario.

[A1] IMF WEO Apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Aggregierte Sifo/Novus/Demoskop Apr–Mai 2026.

Executive Brief Es

BLUF (Conclusión directa)

Probabilidad aproximadamente igual (45–55% [horizon:election]) de que las elecciones al Riksdag del 2026-09-13 produzcan un resultado de parlamento colgado que requiera > 30 días de formación de coalición. La variable estructural decisiva es la supervivencia de L al umbral del cuatro por ciento (actualmente aproximadamente igual 50–65%; improbable 30–45% que L supere el 5%); la variable secundaria es la preferencia de coalición de C (centro vs centro rojo-verde dirigido por S).

Tres conclusiones que definen el ciclo (hacia adelante)

1. La continuación del Tidö bajo el apoyo M+KD(+L)+SD es el resultado modal pero minoritario (32% sobre las hojas A1/A2/A3). Dentro del Escenario A, probablemente (60–70%) A2 (Tidö sin L) domina si L cae por debajo del 4%.
2. La gobernanza rojo-verde-centro dirigida por S (28% sobre C1/C2/C3) es el segundo clúster más probable, con C1 (mayoría S-MP-V) como hoja C modal al 11,2%.
3. Los resultados de parlamento colgado (22%) conllevan un aproximadamente igual (40–55%) riesgo de gobierno en funciones de 60+ días, y un improbable (15–25%) desencadenante de elección extraordinaria para Q1-2027.

Por qué importa ahora (mayo de 2026)

• El posicionamiento de fin de mandato por la oposición (HD10483 ley de consentimiento, HD10484 atención a mayores, HD10485 tributación de la prostitución, HD10486 igualdad salarial, HD01NU21 marco rural) señala construcción de plataformas de campaña; probablemente (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) estos aparecerán como pilares de coalición gobernante en cualquier escenario C.
• La limpieza del atraso de cumplimiento de la UE por la coalición saliente (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 clearing) — el gobierno entrante hereda riesgo prácticamente nulo de infracción pero propiedad política limitada.
• IMF WEO abr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: trayectoria sueca estable; GGXWDG_NGDP 32,4% (2026) → 34,6% (2030) referencia; riesgo a la baja improbable (20–35%) en escenario de choque fiscal.

Top-3 riesgos (después de 2026)

Top-3 cisnes negros (riesgos extremos)

• W1 La escalada rusa fuerza una formación de coalición de emergencia: 8% [18mo]
• W3 Gran KU-anmälan sostenida durante la campaña: 12% [6mo]
• W5 Crisis de sucesión del liderazgo de SD entre el anuncio y 2027: 9% [18mo]

Distribución completa en wildcards-blackswans.md.

Puntos de decisión para partes interesadas

• Actores del lado presupuestario (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): planificar para un escenario de retraso presupuestario de 30 a 60 días con probabilidad probable (60–75% [election]) bajo cualquier hoja no-A1.
• Socios institucionales de la UE: anticipar probablemente (60–70% [cycle]) mociones de oposición sobre plazos de transposición HD01CU30 en escenarios C.
• Socios de la OTAN: piso de gasto en defensa muy probable (75–90% [cycle]) duradero; los compromisos con la OTAN no dependen de la coalición.

Ruta de lectura

1. scenario-analysis.md — árbol de 12 hojas, descomposición de probabilidades.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — asignaciones de escaños Sainte-Laguë por cosecha de encuestas.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 comodines + 3 cisnes negros.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — métricas de banda de horizonte plurianual (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — impulsores estructurales por escenario.

[A1] IMF WEO abr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Sifo/Novus/Demoskop agregados abr–may 2026.

Executive Brief Fi

BLUF (Ydinjohtopäätös)

Suunnilleen tasan (45–55% [horizon:election]) mahdollisuus sille, että Riksdagsval 2026-09-13 tuottaa ripuliparlamentin kaltaisen tuloksen, joka vaatii > 30 päivän koalitionmuodostuksen. Ratkaiseva rakenteellinen muuttuja on L:n selviytyminen neljän prosentin kynnyksestä (tällä hetkellä suunnilleen tasan 50–65%; epätodennäköistä 30–45% että L ylittää 5%); toissijainen muuttuja on C:n koalitio-preferenssi (keskusta vs S-johtama punavihreä-keskusta).

Kolme sykliä määrittelevää johtopäätöstä (eteenpäin)

1. Tidön jatko M+KD(+L)+SD-tuella on modaalinen mutta vähemmistö-tulos (32% A1/A2/A3-lehtien yli). Skenaario A:ssa dominoi todennäköisesti (60–70%) A2 (Tidö ilman L), jos L lipsuu alle 4%:n.
2. S-johtama punavihreä-keskusta-hallinto (28% C1/C2/C3:n yli) on toiseksi todennäköisin klusteri, C1 (S-MP-V-enemmistö) modaalisena C-lehtenä 11,2%:lla.
3. Ripuliparlamentin tulokset (22%) kantavat suunnilleen tasan (40–55%) toimitusministeristöriskiä 60+ päiväksi sekä epätodennäköistä (15–25%) ylimääräistä vaalilaukaisijaa Q1-2027 mennessä.

Miksi tällä on merkitystä nyt (toukokuu 2026)

• Loppukauden positiointi oppositiolta (HD10483 suostumuslaki, HD10484 vanhustenhoito, HD10485 prostituutioverotus, HD10486 tasa-arvoiset palkat, HD01NU21 maaseutupolitiikka) viestii kampanjaohjelman rakentamisesta; todennäköisesti (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) nämä nousevat hallintokoalition pilareiksi jonkin C-skenaarion alla.
• EU-vaatimustenmukaisuusrästin siivous lähtevältä koalitiolta (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 clearing) — saapuva hallitus perii nolla-rikkomusriskin mutta rajoitetun poliittisen omistajuuden.
• IMF WEO huhtikuu-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: Ruotsin suuntaus vakaa; GGXWDG_NGDP 32,4% (2026) → 34,6% (2030) perusura; alariski epätodennäköistä (20–35%) finansiishokkiskenaariossa.

Top-3 riskit (vuoden 2026 jälkeen)

Top-3 mustat joutsenet (ääreiset riskit)

• W1 Venäjän eskaloituminen pakottaa hätäkoalitionmuodostuksen: 8% [18mo]
• W3 Suuri KU-anmälan ylläpidetty kampanjan aikana: 12% [6mo]
• W5 SD:n johtovaalikriisi ilmoituksen ja 2027:n välillä: 9% [18mo]

Täydellinen jakauma wildcards-blackswans.md-tiedostossa.

Päätöspisteet sidosryhmille

• Budjettipuolen toimijat (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): suunnittele 30–60 päivän budjettiviivästysskenaariolle todennäköisesti (60–75% [election]) minkä tahansa ei-A1-lehden alla.
• EU-institutionaaliset kumppanit: ennakoi todennäköisesti (60–70% [cycle]) oppositiomootioita HD01CU30-toimeenpanoaikatauluista C-skenaarioiden alla.
• NATO-kumppanit: puolustusmenokatto hyvin todennäköisesti (75–90% [cycle]) kestävä; NATO-sitoumukset eivät ole koalitionriippuvaisia.

Lukupolku

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12-lehtinen puu, todennäköisyyshajotus.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — Sainte-Laguë -mandaattijakaumat mielipidemittausvintagen mukaan.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 jokeria + 3 mustaa joutsenta.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — monivuotiset horisonttimittarit (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — rakenteelliset tekijät per skenaario.

[A1] IMF WEO huhtikuu-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Yhdistetty Sifo/Novus/Demoskop huhtikuu–toukokuu 2026.

Executive Brief Fr

BLUF (Conclusion directe)

Probabilité équilibrée (45–55% [horizon:election]) que les élections au Riksdag du 2026-09-13 produisent un résultat de parlement suspendu exigeant > 30 jours de formation de coalition. La variable structurelle décisive est la survie de L au seuil des quatre pour cent (actuellement à peu près équilibrée 50–65% ; improbable 30–45% que L dépasse 5%) ; la variable secondaire est la préférence de coalition de C (centre vs centre gauche-vert dirigé par S).

Trois conclusions définissant le cycle (en avant)

1. La continuation Tidö sous le soutien M+KD(+L)+SD est le résultat modal mais minoritaire (32% sur les feuilles A1/A2/A3). Au sein du Scénario A, probablement (60–70%) A2 (Tidö sans L) domine si L glisse sous 4%.
2. La gouvernance centre gauche-vert dirigé par S (28% sur C1/C2/C3) est le deuxième cluster le plus probable, avec C1 (majorité S-MP-V) comme feuille C modale à 11,2%.
3. Les résultats de parlement suspendu (22%) comportent un risque à peu près équilibré (40–55%) de gouvernement d'affaires courantes de 60+ jours, et un improbable (15–25%) déclencheur d'élection extraordinaire d'ici Q1-2027.

Pourquoi c'est important maintenant (mai 2026)

• Le positionnement de fin de mandat par l'opposition (HD10483 loi sur le consentement, HD10484 soins aux personnes âgées, HD10485 imposition de la prostitution, HD10486 égalité salariale, HD01NU21 cadre rural) signale la construction de plateformes de campagne ; probablement (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) ceux-ci apparaîtront comme des piliers de coalition gouvernante dans tout scénario C.
• L'assainissement du retard de conformité UE par la coalition sortante (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 clearing) — le gouvernement entrant hérite d'un risque quasi-nul d'infraction mais d'une propriété politique limitée.
• IMF WEO avr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0 : trajectoire suédoise stable ; GGXWDG_NGDP 32,4% (2026) → 34,6% (2030) de référence ; risque baissier improbable (20–35%) dans un scénario de choc fiscal.

Top-3 des risques (après 2026)

Top-3 des cygnes noirs (risques extrêmes)

• W1 L'escalade russe force une formation de coalition d'urgence : 8% [18mo]
• W3 Grande KU-anmälan maintenue durant la campagne : 12% [6mo]
• W5 Crise de succession à la direction de SD entre l'annonce et 2027 : 9% [18mo]

Distribution complète dans wildcards-blackswans.md.

Points de décision pour les parties prenantes

• Acteurs budgétaires (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet) : planifier pour un scénario de retard budgétaire de 30 à 60 jours avec une probabilité probable (60–75% [election]) sous toute feuille non-A1.
• Partenaires institutionnels de l'UE : anticiper probablement (60–70% [cycle]) des motions d'opposition sur les délais de transposition HD01CU30 dans les scénarios C.
• Partenaires de l'OTAN : le plancher des dépenses de défense très probablement (75–90% [cycle]) durable ; les engagements de l'OTAN ne sont pas tributaires de la coalition.

Parcours de lecture

1. scenario-analysis.md — arbre à 12 feuilles, décomposition des probabilités.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — répartition des sièges Sainte-Laguë par millésime de sondage.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 jokers + 3 cygnes noirs.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — métriques de bande d'horizon pluriannuelles (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — moteurs structurels par scénario.

[A1] IMF WEO avr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0 ; [A2] Sifo/Novus/Demoskop agrégés avr–mai 2026.

Executive Brief He

title: "סיכום מנהלים — תחזית מנדט לאחר 2026 (מחזור/הבא)"

language: he subfolder: election-cycle/next

workflow: news-election-cycle horizon: cycle

סיכום מנהלים — תחזית מנדט לאחר 2026

BLUF (מסקנה עיקרית)

הסתברות שווה בערך (45–55% [horizon:election]) לכך שבחירות הריקסדאג של 2026-09-13 יניבו תוצאת פרלמנט תלוי הדורשת > 30 יום לגיבוש קואליציה. המשתנה המבני הקריטי הוא הישרדות L מעל סף ארבעת האחוזים (כרגע שווה בערך 50–65%; לא סביר 30–45% שL תחצה 5%); המשתנה המשני הוא העדפת הקואליציה של C (מרכז מול מרכז ירוק-שמאל בהנהגת S).

שלוש מסקנות מגדירות מחזור (קדימה)

1. המשך הסכמת טידו בתמיכת M+KD(+L)+SD הוא התוצאה הנפוצה ביותר אך מיעוטית (32% על עלי A1/A2/A3). בתוך תרחיש A, ככל הנראה (60–70%) A2 (טידו ללא L) ישלוט אם L תרד מ-4%.
2. ממשל ירוק-שמאל בהנהגת S (28% על C1/C2/C3) הוא האשכול השני בסבירותו, עם C1 (רוב S-MP-V) כעלה C הנפוץ ביותר ב-11.2%.
3. תוצאות פרלמנט תלוי (22%) נושאות סיכון שווה בערך (40–55%) של ממשלת מעבר למשך 60+ יום, וסיכון לא סביר (15–25%) של הפעלת בחירות חוץ-תורניות לרבעון הראשון 2027.

מדוע זה חשוב עכשיו (מאי 2026)

• מיצוב סוף כהונה על ידי האופוזיציה (HD10483 חוק הסכמה, HD10484 טיפול קשישים, HD10485 מיסוי זנות, HD10486 שוויון שכר, HD01NU21 מסגרת כפרית) מאותת על בניית פלטפורמות קמפיין; ככל הנראה (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) אלה יופיעו כעמודי תווך של קואליציה שלטת בכל תרחיש C.
• ניקוי פיגורי ציות לאיחוד האירופי על ידי הקואליציה היוצאת (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 ניקיון) — הממשלה הנכנסת יורשת סיכון הפרה כמעט אפס אך בעלות פוליטית מוגבלת.
• IMF WEO אפריל 2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: מסלול שוודי יציב; GGXWDG_NGDP 32.4% (2026) → 34.6% (2030) כבסיס; סיכון שלילי לא סביר (20–35%) בתרחיש זעזוע פיסקלי.

3 סיכונים עיקריים (לאחר 2026)

3 ברבורים שחורים עיקריים (סיכונים קיצוניים)

• W1 הסלמה רוסית מכריחה גיבוש קואליציית חירום: 8% [18mo]
• W3 KU-anmälan גדול נמשך בזמן הקמפיין: 12% [6mo]
• W5 משבר ירושת מנהיגות SD בין ההכרזה ל-2027: 9% [18mo]

הפצה מלאה ב-wildcards-blackswans.md.

נקודות החלטה למחזיקי עניין

• גורמי צד תקציב (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): לתכנן תרחיש עיכוב תקציבי של 30–60 יום בהסתברות ככל הנראה (60–75% [election]) תחת כל עלה שאינו A1.
• שותפים מוסדיים באיחוד האירופי: לצפות ככל הנראה (60–70% [cycle]) להצעות אופוזיציה על לוחות זמנים ליישום HD01CU30 בתרחישי C.
• שותפי נאט"ו: רצפת הוצאות ביטחון סביר מאוד (75–90% [cycle]) בת-קיימא; התחייבויות נאט"ו אינן תלויות-קואליציה.

מסלול קריאה

1. scenario-analysis.md — עץ 12 עלים, פירוק הסתברויות.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — הקצאת מנדטים Sainte-Laguë לפי יבול סקרים.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 קלפים שרירותיים + 3 ברבורים שחורים.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — מדדי רצועת אופק רב-שנתי (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — מניעים מבניים לפי תרחיש.

[A1] IMF WEO אפריל 2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Sifo/Novus/Demoskop מצטבר אפריל–מאי 2026.

Executive Brief Ja

BLUF（結論）

2026年9月13日のリクスダーグ選挙が30日超の連立交渉を要するハング・パーラメント的結果をもたらす確率はほぼ互角（45–55% [horizon:election]）。決定的な構造変数はL党の4%閾値突破の可否（現在ほぼ互角 50–65%；L党が5%を超える確率は低い 30–45%）；副次変数はC党の連立優先選択（中道路線対S党主導の赤緑中道路線）。

サイクルを規定する3つの結論（将来展望）

1. ティドー協定の継続（M+KD(+L)+SD支持）は最頻だが少数派の結果（A1/A2/A3葉で32%）。シナリオA内では、L党が4%を割り込んだ場合、おそらく（60–70%）A2（LなしのTidö）が支配的となる。
2. S党主導の赤緑中道政権（C1/C2/C3で28%）は第2位の確率クラスター。C1（S-MP-V過半数）がモーダルC葉（11.2%）。
3. ハング・パーラメント結果（22%）には、ほぼ互角（40–55%）の60日超の暫定政府リスク、および低い（15–25%）の2027年Q1への臨時選挙誘発を伴う。

なぜ今重要か（2026年5月）

• 野党による任期末ポジショニング（HD10483同意法、HD10484高齢者ケア、HD10485売春税、HD10486賃金平等、HD01NU21農村枠組み）はキャンペーン・プラットフォーム構築の合図；おそらく（60–75% [horizon:cycle]）これらはいずれのCシナリオにおいても連立与党の柱として浮上する。
• 退任連立による EU コンプライアンス未処理分の整理（HD01CU30 EPBD、HD01FiU38 クリアリング）— 次期政権は違反リスクをほぼゼロで引き継ぐが政治的所有権は限定的。
• IMF WEO 2026年4月 [horizon:cycle] T+0：スウェーデンの軌道は安定；GGXWDG_NGDP 32.4%（2026）→ 34.6%（2030）のベースライン；財政ショックシナリオでの下方リスクは低い（20–35%）。

上位3リスク（2026年以降）

上位3ブラックスワン（極端リスク）

• W1 ロシアの激化が緊急連立形成を強制：8% [18mo]
• W3 選挙運動中に大規模KU-anmälanが持続：12% [6mo]
• W5 SD党首継承危機（表明から2027年の間）：9% [18mo]

完全な分布は wildcards-blackswans.md を参照。

ステークホルダーへの意思決定ポイント

• 予算側アクター（Konjunkturinstitutet、ESV、finanspolitiska rådet）：A1以外のすべての葉においておそらく（60–75% [election]）の確率で30〜60日の予算遅延シナリオを計画する。
• EU制度的パートナー：Cシナリオ下でのHD01CU30実施スケジュールに関する野党動議をおそらく（60–70% [cycle]）予期する。
• NATOパートナー：防衛費フロアは非常に可能性が高い（75–90% [cycle]）持続的；NATO義務は連立非依存。

読書パス

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12葉ツリー、確率分解。
2. coalition-mathematics.md — 世論調査ビンテージ別サント・ラゲ議席配分。
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — ワイルドカード5件 + ブラックスワン3件。
4. cycle-trajectory.md — 複数年ホライズンバンド指標（T+1y / T+2y / T+5y）。
5. pestle-analysis.md — シナリオ別構造的ドライバー。

[A1] IMF WEO 2026年4月 [horizon:cycle] T+0；[A2] Sifo/Novus/Demoskop集計 2026年4〜5月。

Executive Brief Ko

BLUF (핵심 결론)

2026년 9월 13일 리크스다그 선거가 30일 이상의 연립 협상이 필요한 교착 의회 결과를 초래할 확률은 대략 동등 (45–55% [horizon:election]). 결정적 구조 변수는 L당의 4% 임계값 생존 여부 (현재 대략 동등 50–65%; L당이 5%를 초과할 확률은 낮음 30–45%); 이차 변수는 C당의 연립 선호 (중도 대 S 주도의 적녹 중도).

사이클을 규정하는 3가지 결론 (전망)

1. 티도 협약 지속 (M+KD(+L)+SD 지지)은 최빈도이나 소수파 결과 (A1/A2/A3 리프 합산 32%). 시나리오 A 내에서, L이 4% 미만으로 하락 시 아마도 (60–70%) A2 (L 없는 Tidö)가 지배적.
2. S 주도 적녹 중도 통치 (C1/C2/C3 합산 28%)가 두 번째로 가능성 높은 클러스터이며, C1 (S-MP-V 다수)이 11.2%로 모달 C 리프.
3. 교착 의회 결과 (22%)는 대략 동등 (40–55%)의 60일 이상 관리 내각 리스크와 낮음 (15–25%)의 2027년 1분기 임시 선거 촉발을 동반.

지금 중요한 이유 (2026년 5월)

• 야당의 임기 말 포지셔닝 (HD10483 동의법, HD10484 노인 돌봄, HD10485 성매매세, HD10486 임금 평등, HD01NU21 농촌 프레임워크)은 캠페인 플랫폼 구축 신호; 아마도 (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) 이는 C 시나리오에서 집권 연립의 지주로 부상.
• 퇴임 연립의 EU 미처리 의무 정리 (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 청산) — 차기 정부는 위반 리스크 거의 0을 물려받으나 정치적 소유권은 제한적.
• IMF WEO 2026년 4월 [horizon:cycle] T+0: 스웨덴 궤도 안정; GGXWDG_NGDP 32.4% (2026) → 34.6% (2030) 기준선; 재정 충격 시나리오의 하방 리스크는 낮음 (20–35%).

상위 3 리스크 (2026년 이후)

상위 3 블랙스완 (극단 리스크)

• W1 러시아 확전이 비상 연립 형성 강제: 8% [18mo]
• W3 선거운동 중 대규모 KU-anmälan 지속: 12% [6mo]
• W5 SD 당대표 승계 위기 (발표~2027년): 9% [18mo]

전체 분포는 wildcards-blackswans.md 참조.

이해관계자 의사결정 포인트

• 예산 측 행위자 (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): A1 이외 모든 리프에서 아마도 (60–75% [election]) 확률로 30~60일 예산 지연 시나리오 계획.
• EU 기관 파트너: C 시나리오에서 HD01CU30 이행 일정에 관한 야당 동의안을 아마도 (60–70% [cycle]) 예상.
• NATO 파트너: 국방비 지출 하한은 매우 가능성 높음 (75–90% [cycle]) 지속적; NATO 의무는 연립 비의존.

독서 경로

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12 리프 트리, 확률 분해.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — 여론조사 빈티지별 생트라게 의석 배분.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 와일드카드 5개 + 블랙스완 3개.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — 다년간 지평 밴드 지표 (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — 시나리오별 구조적 동인.

[A1] IMF WEO 2026년 4월 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Sifo/Novus/Demoskop 집계 2026년 4~5월.

Executive Brief Nl

BLUF (Kernconclusie)

Ongeveer gelijk (45–55% [horizon:election]) dat de Riksdag-verkiezingen van 2026-09-13 een hangen-parlement-achtig resultaat opleveren dat > 30 dagen coalitievorming vereist. De beslissende structurele variabele is L's overleving van de vier-procentsdrempel (momenteel ongeveer gelijk 50–65%; onwaarschijnlijk 30–45% dat L 5% overschrijdt); de secundaire variabele is C's coalitiepreferentie (centrum vs S-geleide rood-groen-centrum).

Drie cyclus-bepalende bevindingen (vooruit)

1. Tidö-voortzetting onder M+KD(+L)+SD-steun is het modale maar minderheids-resultaat (32% over A1/A2/A3-bladeren). Binnen Scenario A domineert waarschijnlijk (60–70%) A2 (Tidö zonder L) als L onder 4% zakt.
2. S-geleide rood-groen-centrum-bestuur (28% over C1/C2/C3) is het tweede meest waarschijnlijke cluster, met C1 (S-MP-V-meerderheid) als modaal C-blad op 11,2%.
3. Hangend parlements-resultaten (22%) dragen een ongeveer gelijk (40–55%) demissionair-kabinetsrisico van 60+ dagen, en een onwaarschijnlijke (15–25%) buitengewone-verkiezingstrigger voor Q1-2027.

Waarom dit er nu toe doet (mei 2026)

• Laat-mandaatpositionering door oppositie (HD10483 toestemmingswet, HD10484 ouderenzorg, HD10485 prostitutiebelasting, HD10486 gelijke beloning, HD01NU21 landelijk kader) signaleert campagneplatformconstructie; waarschijnlijk (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) zullen deze opduiken als regerende-coalitieplanken onder elk C-scenario.
• EU-nalevingsachterstandsopruiming door vertrekkende coalitie (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 clearing) — de inkomende regering erft vrijwel nul inbreukrisico maar beperkt politiek eigenaarschap.
• IMF WEO apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: Zweedse baan stabiel; GGXWDG_NGDP 32,4% (2026) → 34,6% (2030) basislijn; neerwaarts risico onwaarschijnlijk (20–35%) bij fiscaal-shockscenario.

Top-3 risico's (na 2026)

Top-3 zwarte zwanen (extreme risico's)

• W1 Russland-escalatie dwingt noodcoalitievorming: 8% [18mo]
• W3 Grote KU-anmälan gehandhaafd tijdens campagne: 12% [6mo]
• W5 SD-leiderschapsopvolgingscrisis tussen aankondiging en 2027: 9% [18mo]

Volledige verdeling in wildcards-blackswans.md.

Beslissingspunten voor stakeholders

• Begrotingszijde-actoren (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): plannen voor 30–60 dagen begrotingsvervagingsscenario met waarschijnlijk (60–75% [election]) kans onder elk niet-A1-blad.
• EU-institutionele partners: anticipeer waarschijnlijk (60–70% [cycle]) oppositiemoties over HD01CU30-implementatietijdlijnen in C-scenario's.
• NAVO-partners: defensie-uitgavenbodem zeer waarschijnlijk (75–90% [cycle]) duurzaam; NAVO-verplichtingen niet coalitie-afhankelijk.

Leespad

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12-bladerboom, kansontbinding.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — Sainte-Laguë-zetelverdeling per opiniepeilingsvintage.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 jokertjes + 3 zwarte zwanen.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — meerjarige horizonband-metrieken (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — structurele drijvers per scenario.

[A1] IMF WEO apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Geaggregeerde Sifo/Novus/Demoskop apr–mei 2026.

Executive Brief No

BLUF (Kjernekonklusjon)

Omtrent like sjanser (45–55% [horizon:election]) for at Riksdagsvalget 2026-09-13 gir et hengt parlamentsresultat som krever > 30 dagers koalisjonsforhandling. Den avgjørende strukturelle variabelen er L's overlevelse av fireprosentssperre (for øyeblikket omtrent like 50–65%; usannsynlig 30–45% at L overskrider 5%); den sekundære variabelen er C's koalisijonspreferanse (sentrum vs S-ledet rødgrønn-sentrum).

Tre sykeldefinierende konklusjoner (fremover)

1. Tidö-fortsettelse under M+KD(+L)+SD-støtte er det modale men minoritets-resultatet (32% over A1/A2/A3-bladene). Innen Scenario A dominerer sannsynligvis (60–70%) A2 (Tidö uten L) hvis L glir under 4%.
2. S-ledet rødgrønn-sentrum-styring (28% over C1/C2/C3) er det nest mest sannsynlige klusteret, med C1 (S-MP-V-flertall) som det modale C-bladet på 11,2%.
3. Hengt parlaments-resultater (22%) bærer en omtrent like (40–55%) forretningsregjeringsrisiko på 60+ dager, og en usannsynlig (15–25%) ekstraordinær valgtrigger innen kvartal 1-2027.

Hvorfor det betyr noe nå (mai 2026)

• Sen-mandatposisjonering av opposisjon (HD10483 samtykkieloven, HD10484 eldreomsorg, HD10485 prostitusjonsskatt, HD10486 likelønn, HD01NU21 distriktsrammeverk) signaliserer kampanjeplatformbygging; sannsynligvis (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) at disse dukker opp som styringskoalisjonspilarer under ethvert C-scenario.
• EU-samsvarresteringsopprydding av avgående koalisjon (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 clearing) — den innkommende regjeringen arver null-bruddrisiko men begrenset politisk eierskap.
• IMF WEO apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: Sveriges bane stabil; GGXWDG_NGDP 32,4% (2026) → 34,6% (2030) basislinje; nedsidesrisiko usannsynlig (20–35%) ved finansielt sjokk-scenario.

Topp-3 risikoer (etter 2026)

Topp-3 sorte svaner (ekstreme risikoer)

• W1 Russlandeskalering tvinger nødkoalisjonsbygging: 8% [18mo]
• W3 Stor KU-anmälan opprettholdt under kampanjen: 12% [6mo]
• W5 SD-ledervalskrise mellom kunngjøring og 2027: 9% [18mo]

Full fordeling i wildcards-blackswans.md.

Beslutningspunkter for interessenter

• Budsjettsidensaktører (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): planlegg for 30–60 dagers budsjettforsinkelsesSCENARIO med sannsynligvis (60–75% [election]) sannsynlighet under ethvert ikke-A1-blad.
• EU-institusjonelle partnere: forvent sannsynligvis (60–70% [cycle]) opposisjonsmotioner om HD01CU30-implementeringstidslinjer under C-scenarier.
• NATO-partnere: forsvarsbudsjettgulv svært sannsynlig (75–90% [cycle]) holdbart; NATO-forpliktelser ikke koalisjonsavhengige.

Lesevei

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12-bladstree, sannsynlighetsdekomposisjon.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — Sainte-Laguë mandatfordelinger per meningsmålingstapping.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 jokerkort + 3 sorte svaner.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — flerårige horisontbåndsmålinger (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — strukturelle drivere per scenario.

[A1] IMF WEO apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Aggregerte Sifo/Novus/Demoskop apr–mai 2026.

Executive Brief Sv

BLUF (Kärnresultat)

Jämn chans (45–55% [horizon:election]) att riksdagsvalet 2026-09-13 ger ett parlamentsläge som kräver > 30 dagars koalitionsbildning. Den avgörande strukturella variabeln är L:s överlevnad av fyraprocentsspärren (för närvarande ungefär lika 50–65%; osannolikt 30–45% att L överstiger 5%); den sekundära variabeln är C:s koalitionspreferens (center kontra S-ledd rödgrön-center).

Tre cykeldefinerande slutsatser (framåt)

1. Tidö-fortsättning under M+KD(+L)+SD-stöd är det modala men minoritets-resultatet (32% över A1/A2/A3-löven). Inom Scenario A dominerar sannolikt (60–70%) A2 (Tidö utan L) om L halkar under 4%.
2. S-ledd rödgrön-center-styrning (28% över C1/C2/C3) är det näst mest sannolika klustret, med C1 (S-MP-V-majoritet) som det modala C-lövet på 11,2%.
3. Läsningssituations-resultat (22%) bär en ungefär lika (40–55%) förvaltningsregeringsrisk på 60+ dagar, och en osannolikt (15–25%) extraordinärt-val-utlösare till kvartal 1-2027.

Varför det spelar roll nu (maj 2026)

• Sen-mandatpositionering av opposition (HD10483 samtyckeslagen, HD10484 äldrevård, HD10485 prostitutionsbeskattning, HD10486 lika lön, HD01NU21 landsbygdspolitik) signalerar kampanjplattformskonstruktion; sannolikt (60–75% [horizon:cycle]) att dessa dyker upp som styrningskoalitionspelare under något C-scenario.
• EU-efterlevnadsresteringsrensning av avgående koalition (HD01CU30 EPBD, HD01FiU38 clearing) — den inkommande regeringen ärver noll-intrångningsrisk men begränsat politiskt ägarskap.
• IMF WEO apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0: Sveriges bana stabil; GGXWDG_NGDP 32,4% (2026) → 34,6% (2030) baslinje; nedsidesrisk osannolikt (20–35%) vid finansiellt chockscenario.

Topp-3 risker (efter 2026)

Topp-3 svarta svanar (extrema risker)

• W1 Rysslandeskalering tvingar fram nödkoalitionsbildning: 8% [18mo]
• W3 Stor KU-anmälan upprätthållen under kampanjen: 12% [6mo]
• W5 SD-ledarskapskris mellan tillkännagivande och 2027: 9% [18mo]

Full fördelning i wildcards-blackswans.md.

Beslutspunkter för intressenter

• Budgetsidans aktörer (Konjunkturinstitutet, ESV, finanspolitiska rådet): planera för 30–60 dagars budgetförsenningsscenario med sannolikt (60–75% [election]) sannolikhet under vilket icke-A1-löv.
• EU-institutionella partner: förutse sannolikt (60–70% [cycle]) oppositionsmotioner om HD01CU30-genomförandetidslinjer under C-scenarier.
• NATO-partner: försvarskostnadstak mycket sannolikt (75–90% [cycle]) hållbart; NATO-åtaganden inte koalitionsberoende.

Läsväg

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12-lövsträd, sannolikhetsuppdelning.
2. coalition-mathematics.md — Sainte-Laguë mandatfördelning per opinionsundersökningstappning.
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5 vildkort + 3 svarta svanar.
4. cycle-trajectory.md — flerårig horisontbandsmätare (T+1y / T+2y / T+5y).
5. pestle-analysis.md — strukturella drivkrafter per scenario.

[A1] IMF WEO apr-2026 [horizon:cycle] T+0; [A2] Aggregerade Sifo/Novus/Demoskop apr–maj 2026.

Executive Brief Zh

BLUF（核心结论）

2026年9月13日的瑞典议会选举产生需要超过30天组建联合政府的悬挂议会结果的概率大致相当（45–55% [horizon:election]）。决定性的结构变量是L党能否在4%门槛以上生存（目前大致相当 50–65%；L党超过5%的概率较低 30–45%）；次要变量是C党的联合偏好（中间路线 对 S党主导的红绿中间路线）。

三个周期决定性结论（前瞻）

1. Tidö协议延续（在M+KD(+L)+SD支持下）是最常见但少数派的结果（A1/A2/A3叶合计32%）。在场景A内，如果L党跌破4%，可能（60–70%）A2（无L的Tidö）占主导。
2. S党主导的红绿中间执政（C1/C2/C3合计28%）是第二可能的聚类，C1（S-MP-V多数）以11.2%成为最常见C叶。
3. 悬挂议会结果（22%）伴随大致相当（40–55%）的60天以上看守内阁风险，以及较低（15–25%）的2027年Q1额外选举触发风险。

为何现在重要（2026年5月）

• 反对党的任期末定位（HD10483知情同意法、HD10484老年护理、HD10485卖淫税、HD10486同工同酬、HD01NU21农村框架）标志着竞选纲领构建；可能（60–75% [horizon:cycle]）这些将在任何C场景中以联合执政支柱的形式出现。
• 离任联合政府的欧盟合规积压清理（HD01CU30 EPBD、HD01FiU38清算）— 新一届政府几乎零违规风险，但政治所有权有限。
• IMF WEO 2026年4月 [horizon:cycle] T+0：瑞典轨道稳定；GGXWDG_NGDP 32.4%（2026）→ 34.6%（2030）基线；财政冲击情景下行风险较低（20–35%）。

前三大风险（2026年后）

前三大黑天鹅（极端风险）

• W1 俄罗斯升级迫使紧急联合组建：8% [18mo]
• W3 竞选期间大型KU-anmälan持续：12% [6mo]
• W5 SD领导层交接危机（公告至2027年间）：9% [18mo]

完整分布见 wildcards-blackswans.md。

利益相关方决策要点

• 预算侧行为者（Konjunkturinstitutet、ESV、finanspolitiska rådet）：在所有非A1叶情况下，以可能（60–75% [election]）的概率规划30–60天预算延迟情景。
• 欧盟机构合作伙伴：在C场景下可能（60–70% [cycle]）预见关于HD01CU30实施时间表的反对党动议。
• 北约合作伙伴：国防支出基准很可能（75–90% [cycle]）持续；北约义务不依赖联合格局。

阅读路径

1. scenario-analysis.md — 12叶树，概率分解。
2. coalition-mathematics.md — 按民调样本的Sainte-Laguë席位分配。
3. wildcards-blackswans.md — 5个通配符 + 3个黑天鹅。
4. cycle-trajectory.md — 多年期时间轴带指标（T+1y / T+2y / T+5y）。
5. pestle-analysis.md — 各场景结构性驱动因素。

[A1] IMF WEO 2026年4月 [horizon:cycle] T+0；[A2] Sifo/Novus/Demoskop汇总 2026年4–5月。

Analysis Artifact Coverage Report

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